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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
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Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa (CIVETS) have shaped 
their foreign economic policies in line with the Washington Consensus and have 
implemented strategies to attract foreign investment as a possible way out of the current 
nancial crisis. Once multilateral trade rules were agreed under the WTO, these countries 
revised their domestic trade policies in order to cope with both the organisational principles 
and the international investment standards promoted by international nancial institutions. 
Despite the fact that transnational economic groups have been focussing their attention on 
these ‘new investment miracles’ since the coining of the term CIVETS in 2009, the CIVETS 
governments have shown no interest in coordinating their foreign economic policies on 
investment issues. In this paper we argue that the emerging economies of CIVETS exemplify 
a case of unintended foreign economic policy convergence, facilitated by systemic causes. 
ese include their common need to overcome historic processes of adverse economic 
transition while getting inserted successfully into world trade; as well as domestic variables 
like the similar ideas of CIVETS policy makers.
Keywords: Foreign economic policies, CIVETS, convergence, emerging economies, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), negotiating strategies, free trade agreements (FTAs), bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). 
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
In the current multipolar world, developing countries have implemented strategies to 
internationalise their economies through unilateral, bilateral and multilateral strategies of 
negotiation and action. Emerging economies have adopted GATT/WTO principles – 
(non-discrimination; transparency; predictability) – and recognized them bilaterally in trade 
and investment treaties which have contributed to what Salacuse (2010) calls the already 
complex ‘networks’ of international investment treaties like free trade agreements (FTAs), 
strategic partnerships (SPs), and bilateral investment treaties (BITs). In addition, the 
domestic policy agendas of emerging economies have featured the revision and improvement 
of their investment climate in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and encourage 
local investment. However, the policy changes in these countries have not been responding 
only to pressures or inuences from the international economic system; domestic factors 
related to historic milestones of an economic and political nature must be considered in the 
analysis. In this sense, the group of emerging economies recognised as economic miracles in 
2009 under the acronym CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South 
Africa) participate unilaterally in the international economic system as receivers or followers 
of a transnational policy network on foreign investment issues.
 
is working paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of CIVETS by exploring, from 
a comparative perspective, the foreign economic policy (FEP) convergence amongst them. It 
approaches the convergence phenomenon by taking into account systemic, domestic, and 
cognitive (or ideational) factors, including these countries’ common motives to overcome 
nancial crises, adopt IMF recommendations, and internationalise their economies; as well 
as their policy makers’ and foreign policy elites’ ideas about adopting multilateral, bilateral, 
and unilateral schemes.
e CIVETS’ foreign economic policies (FEPs) will be analysed between 2000 and 2010, 
during which time, except for Colombia, the CIVETS countries intensied their negotiating 
strategy of pursuing international investment agreements (IIAs). Methodologically, our 
comparative approach takes account of two independent variables: (i) negotiating strategies 
leading to IIAs, and (ii) CIVETS’ policy makers’ ideas.
 
e paper proceeds as follows. In the rst section, historic and economic milestones will be 
invoked to provide contextual background. A connection will be established between the 
theoretical structures used to analyse FEP convergence and the CIVETS countries’ histories 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
1.  “e assemblage of ocial decisions and plans employed by a state to interact with the international economic environment in 
order to meet the demands of domestic economic development as perceived by the ruling class or group.”
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
REFERENCES.
 
Alden, Chris & Maxi Schoeman. 2013. “South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leadership in a transforming 
global.” International Aairs 89: 113. 
Alden, Chris & Marco Antonio Vieira. 2007. “La nueva diplomacia del Sur: Brasil, Sudáfrica, India y el trilateralismo”. In India, 
Brasil y Sudáfrica: El impacto de las nuevas potencias regionales. Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel (ed.). Buenos Aires: Libros del Zorzal.
Atli, Altay. 2011. “Businessmen as Diplomats: e Role of Business Associations in Turkey’s Foreign Economic Policy”. Insight 
Turkey, 13(1): 109-128. 
Beresford, Melanie. 2008. “Doi Moi in Review: Building Market Socialism in Vietnam”. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(2): 221-243.
Berzok, Lale & Sevkiye Turk. 2009. “Locational Preferences of FDI Firms in Turkey: A Detailed Examination of Regional 
Determinants”. European Planning Studies, 17(8): 1243-1256.
Büte, Tim & Helen Milner. 2008. “e Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI 
through International Trade Agreements?” American Journal of Political Science, 52(4): 741-762.
Chase, Robert, Emily Hill & Paul Kennedy. 1996. “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy Essay”. Foreign Aairs, 35(1): 33-51.
CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
Cohen, Benjamin. 1990. “e Political Economy of International Trade”. International Organization, 44(2): 261-281.  
Chandra, Alexander. 2005. “Indonesia and bilateral trade agreements”. e Pacic Review, 18(4): 541-565.
Dieter, Heribert. 2009. “Changing patterns of regional governance: from security to political economy?” e Pacic Review, 22(1): 73-90.
Dinh, i Hien Luong. 2009. “Vietnam-Japan Relations in the Context of Building an East Asian Community”. Asia-Pacic 
Review, 16(1): 100-129.
Dosch, Jörn. 2006. “Vietnam´s Asian membership Revisited: Golden Opportunity or Golden Age”. Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, 28(2): 234-258.
Draper, Peter. 2011. “For how long can South Africa ‘punch above its weight’?” European View, 10: 207-213. 
Drezner, Daniel. 2001. “Globalization and Policy Convergence”. International Studies Review, 3(1): 53-78.
Flemes, Daniel. 2012. “La política exterior colombiana desde la perspectiva del realismo Neoclásico”. In Colombia: ¿una 
potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior. Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Flemes, Daniel. 2007. “Conceptualising regional power in international relations: Lessons from the South African case”. GIGA 
Working Papers, June, 53.
Farah, Nadia Ramsis. 2009. Egypt´s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.
Fürtig, Henner. 2006. Conference Paper: “Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East”. 
Hamburg: GIGA, 13.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2013. “e Brazilian and the Colombian experiences from the debt crises of the eighties as an 
extension of transnational network policies”. Paper presented at the seminar Financial Stability and Energy Security in the 
Americas and Europe, Boston, Massachusetts, February 13-14.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2012a. “Colombia y Brasil: un análisis desde la perspectiva económica”. In Colombia y Brasil: ¿socios 
estratégicos en la construcción de Suramérica? Eduardo Pastrana, Stefan Jost, and Daniel Flemes (eds.). Bogotá: Editorial Javeriana.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2012b. “Los CIVETS en el horizonte de la política exterior colombiana”. In Colombia: ¿una potencia 
en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior. Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Guy, Arnold. 2000. New South Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hayter, Susan, Gerhard Reinecke & Raymond Torres. 2001. South Africa: Studies on the Social Dimension of Globalization. 
Geneva: International Labour Organization.
Hermann, Margaret, Charles Hermann & Joe Hagan. 1987. “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior”. In New Directions 
in the Study of Foreign Policy, Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley and James N. Rosenau (eds.). Boston: Allen and Unwin.
Hirsch, Alan. 2005. Season of Hope: Economic Reform Under Mandela and Mbeki. Ottawa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
Hoskisson, Robert, Lorraine Eden, Ming Lau Chung & Mike Wright. 2000. “Strategy in Emerging Economies”. e Academy 
of Management Journal, 43(3): 249-267.
Kimura, Ehito. 2011. “Indonesia in 2010”. Asian Survey, 51(1): 186-195.
Kirişci, Kemal. 2009. “e transformation of Turkish foreign policy: e rise of the trading state”. New Perspectives on Turkey, 
40: 33, 37-52.
Landsberg, Chris. 2010a. “Promoting Democracy: e Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine”. Journal of Democracy, 11(3): 107-121.
Landsberg, Chris. 2010b. “South Africa’s foreign policy under abo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma”. Inroads Journal. 
http://www.inroadsjournal.ca/transformation-continuity-and-diusion-south-africas-foreign-policy-under-thabo-mbeki-and-jacob-zuma
Larrabee, F. Stephen & Ian O. Lesser. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. Santa Monica, Arlington and 
Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation.
Liddle, William & Saiful Mujani. 2005. “Indonesia in 2004: e Rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono”. Asian Survey, 45(1): 119-126.
Mantzikos, Ioannis. 2010. “e good multilateralists: Brazil and South Africa in the new area of multilateralism”. Meridiano 47, 11(118): 6.
MIGA. 2012. http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR12.pdf 
McGrath, Luke Aloysius. “Vietnam´s struggle to balance sovereignty, centralization, and foreign investment under Doi Moi”. 
Fordham International Law Journal, 18: 2095-2138.
Murillo, Edwin. 2012. “Hacia una política pública de reconciliación social: tipología y casos”. Revista Papel Político, 17 (2): 423-467. 
Nas, Tevk. 2008. Tracing the Economic Transformation of Turkey from the 1920s to EU Accession. Leiden: Martinus Nijho Publishers.
Nathan, Laurie. 2005. “Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy”. International Aairs, 81 (2): 361-372.
Nel, Philip & Matthew Stephen. 2010. “e Foreign Economic Policies of Regional Powers in the Developing World”. In 
Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers, Daniel Flemes (ed.). Burlington: Ashgate.
Nguen, i Kam o. 2007. “Investment Climate and Foreign Investment in Vietnam”. Studies on Russian Economic 
Development, 18(2): 211-218.
Nolte, Detlef. 2010. “How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics”. Review of International 
Studies, 36: 881–901.
Organization of American States (OAS). http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/COL_EFTA/COL_EFTA_e.ASP 
Öniş, Ziya. 2010. “Multiple faces of the ‘new’ Turkish foreign policy: underlying dynamics and a critique”. GLODEM Working 
Paper Series. Istanbul: Center for Globalization and Democratic Governance.
Painter, Martin. 2005. “e politics of state sector reforms in Vietnam: contested agendas and uncertain trajectories”. e 
Journal of Development Studies, 41(2): 261-283.
Pastrana, Eduardo & Diego Vera. 2012. “De Uribe a Santos: ¿continuidad o nueva orientación de la política exterior colombiana?” In 
Colombia: ¿una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior, Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Ravenhill, John. 2010. “International Political Economy”. In e Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Cristian 
Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Salacuse, Jeswald. 2010. “e Emerging Global Regime for Investment”. Harvard Law Review, 51 (2): 427-473.
Schrim, Stefan A. 2009. “Ideas and interests in global nancial governance: comparing German and US preference formation”. 
Cambridge Review of International Aairs, 22(3): 501-521.
Terzi, Öslem. 2010. e Inuence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy. Burlington: Ashgate.
Tickner, Arlene B., Óscar Pardo & Diego Beltrán. 2006. Qué diplomacia necesita Colombia?: situación, diagnóstico y 
perspectivas de la carrera diplomatica y el servicio exterior. Bogotá: Uniandes Ediciones.
Togan, Sübidey & Hasan Ersel. 2005. “Macroeconomic policies for Turkey´s accession to the EU”. In Turkey: Economic Reform and 
Accession to the European Union, Bernard Hoekman & Sübidey Togan (eds.). Washington: World Bank Publications.
Toh, Mun Heng & Vasudevan Gayathri. 2004. “Impact of Regional Trade Liberalization on Emerging Economies: e Case of 
Vietnam”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 21 (2): 167-182.
UNCTAD. 2011. Database. 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-specic-Lists-of-BITs.aspx 
USTR. 2011-2013. http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Vale, Peter & Sifo Maseko. 1998. “South Africa and the African Renaissance”. International Aairs (Royal Institute of 
International Aairs 1944- ), 74 (2): 271-287.
Velosa, Eduardo. 2012. “Las ideas y la política exterior colombiana: una mirada desde la teoría del rol nacional y el 
institucionalismo discursivo”. In Colombia: ¿una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior, Stefan 
Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Vuving, Alexander. 2006. “Strategy and evolution of Vietnam´s China policy: A changing mixtures of pathways”. Asian Survey, 
46 (6): 805-824. WTO. 2013. Indonesia Trade Policy Review. WT/TPR/S/278.




PhD Candidate, Ponticia Universidad Católica del Perú.
aguerrab@pucp.pe
Álvaro Méndez.
Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Regent’s University London.
Research Fellow, London School of Economics.
mendeza@regents.ac.uk 
a.mendez@lse.ac.uk
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 3. 2015.
6
In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
2. Principles of the Colombian foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Aairs, 08/2010); National Development Plan 2010-2014: 
“Prosperity for All”. 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
REFERENCES.
 
Alden, Chris & Maxi Schoeman. 2013. “South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leadership in a transforming 
global.” International Aairs 89: 113. 
Alden, Chris & Marco Antonio Vieira. 2007. “La nueva diplomacia del Sur: Brasil, Sudáfrica, India y el trilateralismo”. In India, 
Brasil y Sudáfrica: El impacto de las nuevas potencias regionales. Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel (ed.). Buenos Aires: Libros del Zorzal.
Atli, Altay. 2011. “Businessmen as Diplomats: e Role of Business Associations in Turkey’s Foreign Economic Policy”. Insight 
Turkey, 13(1): 109-128. 
Beresford, Melanie. 2008. “Doi Moi in Review: Building Market Socialism in Vietnam”. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(2): 221-243.
Berzok, Lale & Sevkiye Turk. 2009. “Locational Preferences of FDI Firms in Turkey: A Detailed Examination of Regional 
Determinants”. European Planning Studies, 17(8): 1243-1256.
Büte, Tim & Helen Milner. 2008. “e Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI 
through International Trade Agreements?” American Journal of Political Science, 52(4): 741-762.
Chase, Robert, Emily Hill & Paul Kennedy. 1996. “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy Essay”. Foreign Aairs, 35(1): 33-51.
CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
Cohen, Benjamin. 1990. “e Political Economy of International Trade”. International Organization, 44(2): 261-281.  
Chandra, Alexander. 2005. “Indonesia and bilateral trade agreements”. e Pacic Review, 18(4): 541-565.
Dieter, Heribert. 2009. “Changing patterns of regional governance: from security to political economy?” e Pacic Review, 22(1): 73-90.
Dinh, i Hien Luong. 2009. “Vietnam-Japan Relations in the Context of Building an East Asian Community”. Asia-Pacic 
Review, 16(1): 100-129.
Dosch, Jörn. 2006. “Vietnam´s Asian membership Revisited: Golden Opportunity or Golden Age”. Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, 28(2): 234-258.
Draper, Peter. 2011. “For how long can South Africa ‘punch above its weight’?” European View, 10: 207-213. 
Drezner, Daniel. 2001. “Globalization and Policy Convergence”. International Studies Review, 3(1): 53-78.
Flemes, Daniel. 2012. “La política exterior colombiana desde la perspectiva del realismo Neoclásico”. In Colombia: ¿una 
potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior. Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Flemes, Daniel. 2007. “Conceptualising regional power in international relations: Lessons from the South African case”. GIGA 
Working Papers, June, 53.
Farah, Nadia Ramsis. 2009. Egypt´s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.
Fürtig, Henner. 2006. Conference Paper: “Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East”. 
Hamburg: GIGA, 13.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2013. “e Brazilian and the Colombian experiences from the debt crises of the eighties as an 
extension of transnational network policies”. Paper presented at the seminar Financial Stability and Energy Security in the 
Americas and Europe, Boston, Massachusetts, February 13-14.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2012a. “Colombia y Brasil: un análisis desde la perspectiva económica”. In Colombia y Brasil: ¿socios 
estratégicos en la construcción de Suramérica? Eduardo Pastrana, Stefan Jost, and Daniel Flemes (eds.). Bogotá: Editorial Javeriana.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2012b. “Los CIVETS en el horizonte de la política exterior colombiana”. In Colombia: ¿una potencia 
en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior. Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Guy, Arnold. 2000. New South Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hayter, Susan, Gerhard Reinecke & Raymond Torres. 2001. South Africa: Studies on the Social Dimension of Globalization. 
Geneva: International Labour Organization.
Hermann, Margaret, Charles Hermann & Joe Hagan. 1987. “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior”. In New Directions 
in the Study of Foreign Policy, Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley and James N. Rosenau (eds.). Boston: Allen and Unwin.
Hirsch, Alan. 2005. Season of Hope: Economic Reform Under Mandela and Mbeki. Ottawa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
Hoskisson, Robert, Lorraine Eden, Ming Lau Chung & Mike Wright. 2000. “Strategy in Emerging Economies”. e Academy 
of Management Journal, 43(3): 249-267.
Kimura, Ehito. 2011. “Indonesia in 2010”. Asian Survey, 51(1): 186-195.
Kirişci, Kemal. 2009. “e transformation of Turkish foreign policy: e rise of the trading state”. New Perspectives on Turkey, 
40: 33, 37-52.
Landsberg, Chris. 2010a. “Promoting Democracy: e Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine”. Journal of Democracy, 11(3): 107-121.
Landsberg, Chris. 2010b. “South Africa’s foreign policy under abo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma”. Inroads Journal. 
http://www.inroadsjournal.ca/transformation-continuity-and-diusion-south-africas-foreign-policy-under-thabo-mbeki-and-jacob-zuma
Larrabee, F. Stephen & Ian O. Lesser. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. Santa Monica, Arlington and 
Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation.
Liddle, William & Saiful Mujani. 2005. “Indonesia in 2004: e Rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono”. Asian Survey, 45(1): 119-126.
Mantzikos, Ioannis. 2010. “e good multilateralists: Brazil and South Africa in the new area of multilateralism”. Meridiano 47, 11(118): 6.
MIGA. 2012. http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR12.pdf 
McGrath, Luke Aloysius. “Vietnam´s struggle to balance sovereignty, centralization, and foreign investment under Doi Moi”. 
Fordham International Law Journal, 18: 2095-2138.
Murillo, Edwin. 2012. “Hacia una política pública de reconciliación social: tipología y casos”. Revista Papel Político, 17 (2): 423-467. 
Nas, Tevk. 2008. Tracing the Economic Transformation of Turkey from the 1920s to EU Accession. Leiden: Martinus Nijho Publishers.
Nathan, Laurie. 2005. “Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy”. International Aairs, 81 (2): 361-372.
Nel, Philip & Matthew Stephen. 2010. “e Foreign Economic Policies of Regional Powers in the Developing World”. In 
Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers, Daniel Flemes (ed.). Burlington: Ashgate.
Nguen, i Kam o. 2007. “Investment Climate and Foreign Investment in Vietnam”. Studies on Russian Economic 
Development, 18(2): 211-218.
Nolte, Detlef. 2010. “How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics”. Review of International 
Studies, 36: 881–901.
Organization of American States (OAS). http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/COL_EFTA/COL_EFTA_e.ASP 
Öniş, Ziya. 2010. “Multiple faces of the ‘new’ Turkish foreign policy: underlying dynamics and a critique”. GLODEM Working 
Paper Series. Istanbul: Center for Globalization and Democratic Governance.
Painter, Martin. 2005. “e politics of state sector reforms in Vietnam: contested agendas and uncertain trajectories”. e 
Journal of Development Studies, 41(2): 261-283.
Pastrana, Eduardo & Diego Vera. 2012. “De Uribe a Santos: ¿continuidad o nueva orientación de la política exterior colombiana?” In 
Colombia: ¿una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior, Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Ravenhill, John. 2010. “International Political Economy”. In e Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Cristian 
Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Salacuse, Jeswald. 2010. “e Emerging Global Regime for Investment”. Harvard Law Review, 51 (2): 427-473.
Schrim, Stefan A. 2009. “Ideas and interests in global nancial governance: comparing German and US preference formation”. 
Cambridge Review of International Aairs, 22(3): 501-521.
Terzi, Öslem. 2010. e Inuence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy. Burlington: Ashgate.
Tickner, Arlene B., Óscar Pardo & Diego Beltrán. 2006. Qué diplomacia necesita Colombia?: situación, diagnóstico y 
perspectivas de la carrera diplomatica y el servicio exterior. Bogotá: Uniandes Ediciones.
Togan, Sübidey & Hasan Ersel. 2005. “Macroeconomic policies for Turkey´s accession to the EU”. In Turkey: Economic Reform and 
Accession to the European Union, Bernard Hoekman & Sübidey Togan (eds.). Washington: World Bank Publications.
Toh, Mun Heng & Vasudevan Gayathri. 2004. “Impact of Regional Trade Liberalization on Emerging Economies: e Case of 
Vietnam”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 21 (2): 167-182.
UNCTAD. 2011. Database. 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-specic-Lists-of-BITs.aspx 
USTR. 2011-2013. http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Vale, Peter & Sifo Maseko. 1998. “South Africa and the African Renaissance”. International Aairs (Royal Institute of 
International Aairs 1944- ), 74 (2): 271-287.
Velosa, Eduardo. 2012. “Las ideas y la política exterior colombiana: una mirada desde la teoría del rol nacional y el 
institucionalismo discursivo”. In Colombia: ¿una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior, Stefan 
Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Vuving, Alexander. 2006. “Strategy and evolution of Vietnam´s China policy: A changing mixtures of pathways”. Asian Survey, 
46 (6): 805-824. WTO. 2013. Indonesia Trade Policy Review. WT/TPR/S/278.




PhD Candidate, Ponticia Universidad Católica del Perú.
aguerrab@pucp.pe
Álvaro Méndez.
Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Regent’s University London.
Research Fellow, London School of Economics.
mendeza@regents.ac.uk 
a.mendez@lse.ac.uk
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 3. 2015.
7
In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
3. Emerging economies characterised by a rapid economic growth; domestic policies favoring economic liberalisation; and 
adoption of a free-market system. Arnold & Quelch, cited by Hoskisson et al. 2000, ‘Strategy in Emerging Economies’, e 
Academy of Management Journal, 43(3): 249-267.
4. e Indonesian population as of July 2013 was estimated at 251,160,124, followed by Vietnam (92,477,857) and Egypt 
(85,294,388). CIA World Factbook. 71% of the Vietnamese population is young (est. 2012), followed by Turkey (67%), 
Indonesia (66%), Colombia (66%), South Africa (65%) and Egypt (63%). World Bank Data.
5. en Turkey (1.16%) and Vietnam (1.03%). CIA World Factbook.
6. Nolte (2010) classies Egypt, South Africa and Turkey (amongst other countries) as regional powers.
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
7. Equally on economic terms (Hayter et al. 2001:5).
8. e other member states of the SADC are: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
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government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
REFERENCES.
 
Alden, Chris & Maxi Schoeman. 2013. “South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leadership in a transforming 
global.” International Aairs 89: 113. 
Alden, Chris & Marco Antonio Vieira. 2007. “La nueva diplomacia del Sur: Brasil, Sudáfrica, India y el trilateralismo”. In India, 
Brasil y Sudáfrica: El impacto de las nuevas potencias regionales. Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel (ed.). Buenos Aires: Libros del Zorzal.
Atli, Altay. 2011. “Businessmen as Diplomats: e Role of Business Associations in Turkey’s Foreign Economic Policy”. Insight 
Turkey, 13(1): 109-128. 
Beresford, Melanie. 2008. “Doi Moi in Review: Building Market Socialism in Vietnam”. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(2): 221-243.
Berzok, Lale & Sevkiye Turk. 2009. “Locational Preferences of FDI Firms in Turkey: A Detailed Examination of Regional 
Determinants”. European Planning Studies, 17(8): 1243-1256.
Büte, Tim & Helen Milner. 2008. “e Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI 
through International Trade Agreements?” American Journal of Political Science, 52(4): 741-762.
Chase, Robert, Emily Hill & Paul Kennedy. 1996. “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy Essay”. Foreign Aairs, 35(1): 33-51.
CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
Cohen, Benjamin. 1990. “e Political Economy of International Trade”. International Organization, 44(2): 261-281.  
Chandra, Alexander. 2005. “Indonesia and bilateral trade agreements”. e Pacic Review, 18(4): 541-565.
Dieter, Heribert. 2009. “Changing patterns of regional governance: from security to political economy?” e Pacic Review, 22(1): 73-90.
Dinh, i Hien Luong. 2009. “Vietnam-Japan Relations in the Context of Building an East Asian Community”. Asia-Pacic 
Review, 16(1): 100-129.
Dosch, Jörn. 2006. “Vietnam´s Asian membership Revisited: Golden Opportunity or Golden Age”. Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, 28(2): 234-258.
Draper, Peter. 2011. “For how long can South Africa ‘punch above its weight’?” European View, 10: 207-213. 
Drezner, Daniel. 2001. “Globalization and Policy Convergence”. International Studies Review, 3(1): 53-78.
Flemes, Daniel. 2012. “La política exterior colombiana desde la perspectiva del realismo Neoclásico”. In Colombia: ¿una 
potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior. Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Flemes, Daniel. 2007. “Conceptualising regional power in international relations: Lessons from the South African case”. GIGA 
Working Papers, June, 53.
Farah, Nadia Ramsis. 2009. Egypt´s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.
Fürtig, Henner. 2006. Conference Paper: “Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East”. 
Hamburg: GIGA, 13.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2013. “e Brazilian and the Colombian experiences from the debt crises of the eighties as an 
extension of transnational network policies”. Paper presented at the seminar Financial Stability and Energy Security in the 
Americas and Europe, Boston, Massachusetts, February 13-14.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2012a. “Colombia y Brasil: un análisis desde la perspectiva económica”. In Colombia y Brasil: ¿socios 
estratégicos en la construcción de Suramérica? Eduardo Pastrana, Stefan Jost, and Daniel Flemes (eds.). Bogotá: Editorial Javeriana.
Guerra-Barón, Angélica. 2012b. “Los CIVETS en el horizonte de la política exterior colombiana”. In Colombia: ¿una potencia 
en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior. Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Guy, Arnold. 2000. New South Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hayter, Susan, Gerhard Reinecke & Raymond Torres. 2001. South Africa: Studies on the Social Dimension of Globalization. 
Geneva: International Labour Organization.
Hermann, Margaret, Charles Hermann & Joe Hagan. 1987. “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior”. In New Directions 
in the Study of Foreign Policy, Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley and James N. Rosenau (eds.). Boston: Allen and Unwin.
Hirsch, Alan. 2005. Season of Hope: Economic Reform Under Mandela and Mbeki. Ottawa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
Hoskisson, Robert, Lorraine Eden, Ming Lau Chung & Mike Wright. 2000. “Strategy in Emerging Economies”. e Academy 
of Management Journal, 43(3): 249-267.
Kimura, Ehito. 2011. “Indonesia in 2010”. Asian Survey, 51(1): 186-195.
Kirişci, Kemal. 2009. “e transformation of Turkish foreign policy: e rise of the trading state”. New Perspectives on Turkey, 
40: 33, 37-52.
Landsberg, Chris. 2010a. “Promoting Democracy: e Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine”. Journal of Democracy, 11(3): 107-121.
Landsberg, Chris. 2010b. “South Africa’s foreign policy under abo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma”. Inroads Journal. 
http://www.inroadsjournal.ca/transformation-continuity-and-diusion-south-africas-foreign-policy-under-thabo-mbeki-and-jacob-zuma
Larrabee, F. Stephen & Ian O. Lesser. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. Santa Monica, Arlington and 
Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation.
Liddle, William & Saiful Mujani. 2005. “Indonesia in 2004: e Rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono”. Asian Survey, 45(1): 119-126.
Mantzikos, Ioannis. 2010. “e good multilateralists: Brazil and South Africa in the new area of multilateralism”. Meridiano 47, 11(118): 6.
MIGA. 2012. http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR12.pdf 
McGrath, Luke Aloysius. “Vietnam´s struggle to balance sovereignty, centralization, and foreign investment under Doi Moi”. 
Fordham International Law Journal, 18: 2095-2138.
Murillo, Edwin. 2012. “Hacia una política pública de reconciliación social: tipología y casos”. Revista Papel Político, 17 (2): 423-467. 
Nas, Tevk. 2008. Tracing the Economic Transformation of Turkey from the 1920s to EU Accession. Leiden: Martinus Nijho Publishers.
Nathan, Laurie. 2005. “Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy”. International Aairs, 81 (2): 361-372.
Nel, Philip & Matthew Stephen. 2010. “e Foreign Economic Policies of Regional Powers in the Developing World”. In 
Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, interests and strategies of regional powers, Daniel Flemes (ed.). Burlington: Ashgate.
Nguen, i Kam o. 2007. “Investment Climate and Foreign Investment in Vietnam”. Studies on Russian Economic 
Development, 18(2): 211-218.
Nolte, Detlef. 2010. “How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics”. Review of International 
Studies, 36: 881–901.
Organization of American States (OAS). http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/COL_EFTA/COL_EFTA_e.ASP 
Öniş, Ziya. 2010. “Multiple faces of the ‘new’ Turkish foreign policy: underlying dynamics and a critique”. GLODEM Working 
Paper Series. Istanbul: Center for Globalization and Democratic Governance.
Painter, Martin. 2005. “e politics of state sector reforms in Vietnam: contested agendas and uncertain trajectories”. e 
Journal of Development Studies, 41(2): 261-283.
Pastrana, Eduardo & Diego Vera. 2012. “De Uribe a Santos: ¿continuidad o nueva orientación de la política exterior colombiana?” In 
Colombia: ¿una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior, Stefan Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Ravenhill, John. 2010. “International Political Economy”. In e Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Cristian 
Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Salacuse, Jeswald. 2010. “e Emerging Global Regime for Investment”. Harvard Law Review, 51 (2): 427-473.
Schrim, Stefan A. 2009. “Ideas and interests in global nancial governance: comparing German and US preference formation”. 
Cambridge Review of International Aairs, 22(3): 501-521.
Terzi, Öslem. 2010. e Inuence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy. Burlington: Ashgate.
Tickner, Arlene B., Óscar Pardo & Diego Beltrán. 2006. Qué diplomacia necesita Colombia?: situación, diagnóstico y 
perspectivas de la carrera diplomatica y el servicio exterior. Bogotá: Uniandes Ediciones.
Togan, Sübidey & Hasan Ersel. 2005. “Macroeconomic policies for Turkey´s accession to the EU”. In Turkey: Economic Reform and 
Accession to the European Union, Bernard Hoekman & Sübidey Togan (eds.). Washington: World Bank Publications.
Toh, Mun Heng & Vasudevan Gayathri. 2004. “Impact of Regional Trade Liberalization on Emerging Economies: e Case of 
Vietnam”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 21 (2): 167-182.
UNCTAD. 2011. Database. 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-specic-Lists-of-BITs.aspx 
USTR. 2011-2013. http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Vale, Peter & Sifo Maseko. 1998. “South Africa and the African Renaissance”. International Aairs (Royal Institute of 
International Aairs 1944- ), 74 (2): 271-287.
Velosa, Eduardo. 2012. “Las ideas y la política exterior colombiana: una mirada desde la teoría del rol nacional y el 
institucionalismo discursivo”. In Colombia: ¿una potencia en desarrollo? Escenarios y desafíos para su política exterior, Stefan 
Jost (ed.). Bogotá: KAS.
Vuving, Alexander. 2006. “Strategy and evolution of Vietnam´s China policy: A changing mixtures of pathways”. Asian Survey, 
46 (6): 805-824. WTO. 2013. Indonesia Trade Policy Review. WT/TPR/S/278.




PhD Candidate, Ponticia Universidad Católica del Perú.
aguerrab@pucp.pe
Álvaro Méndez.
Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Regent’s University London.
Research Fellow, London School of Economics.
mendeza@regents.ac.uk 
a.mendez@lse.ac.uk
10. e convergence phenomena is exhibited, too, in more FDI ows into Indonesian and Vietnamese territories before the 
nancial crisis of 1997, as 30% of those countries’ GDP came from FDI (Nguen 2007:211).
11.  Yet Indonesia was negotiating a trade agreement with EFTA (UNCTAD Database 2011).
12. as Dinh suggests: Dinh, i Hien Luong (2009), “Vietnam-Japan Relations in the Context of Building an East Asian 
Community”, Asia-Pacic Review, 16(1): 102.
In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
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Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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13. Turkey is a key state because of its population, geographic localization, economic and military potential, elements which could 
aect at both regional and international level (Chance, R., Hill, E. and Kennedy P., cited by Larrabee et al. 2003, 2).
In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
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(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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14.  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (2002); the Palestinian Authority (2004); Morocco, Tunisia and Syria (2005); Egypt (2005); 
Albania (2006); Georgia (2007); Montenegro (2008); and, most recently, Chile and Serbia (2009).
In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
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Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
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e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
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revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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15. In that sense, see Dosch 2006.
16. Such political instability is reected in a FDI decit: U$2,1 billion in July/2010-March/2011 to U$218 million 
July/2011-March/2012 (MIGA, 2012). http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR12.pdf ). Turkey, on the contrary, has not 
experienced such negative eects.
In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
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However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
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Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
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of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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In approaching this enquiry, many scholars have endeavoured to explain policy convergence 
through either structure or agency. According to structural theories, ‘dierent national 
policies are homogenized into one global policy’ by the logic of international institutions 
(Cohen 1990:57). On the other hand, foreign policy is mostly Presidentially driven, CIVETS 
being no exceptions, and the logic of international institutions itself does not suce to 
explain convergence or divergence; therefore, it is necessary to explore the explanatory 
inuence of domestic ideas and interests (Schrim 2009). It will give us a better picture of the 
situation to incorporate this ‘missing middle’ into our analysis of the international political 
economy, taking into account ‘when and how ideas [and norms] matter’ (Ravenhill 2010:551).
2. COMPARING CIVETS’ FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES.
Nine years after the BRICS acronym was coined, a group of investment miracles was recognised by the 
inuential magazine e Economist with a new acronym: CIVETS. ese emerging markets3 were 
considered attractive host countries for transnational enterprises because of their demographic features 
(a young and growing population), their economic conditions (dynamic and growing), and their 
political advantages (relative stability) (Guerra-Barón 2012b, 374). In fact, CIVETS contain an 
important youth population,4 of which Indonesia has the largest proportion and Egypt the highest 
growth rate.5 is conrms the demographic characteristic of the acronym. Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Egypt are middle-income countries, while the rest are middle-to-upper-income. In terms of the 
international power hierarchy, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and South Africa are ‘pivotal states’ (Chase et al. 
1996:37);6 Colombia is a secondary regional player; Brazil is a regional power (Flemes 2012:21); whilst 
Vietnam aspires to be perceived as a medium-weight player in South East Asia. ese dierences 
amongst CIVETS suggest that investment performance in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral contexts 
is the pivotal element which is enough to unify them, policy-wise, even without inter-government 
coordination or cooperation. 
We proceed now to the comparative analysis of pairs of CIVETS members, taking account of 
their dierences as well as similarities.
 
Colombia and South Africa. e Colombian and South African cases are similar, in that both 
nations had long experienced and are still struggling to recover  from paroxysms of conict 
and violence (Murillo 2012, 425). eir leaders also decided in the 1990s to liberalise their 
economies through constitutional and legal mechanisms. e 1990s meant for the Andean 
country a transition from the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of the 1980s 
to the trade openness and economic liberalisation model. e transition process began under 
the Gaviria Presidency (1990-1994) and was furthered by subsequent Presidents Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). While a Colombian strategy to 
diversify the economy began as long ago as the early 20th century, the special emphasis on 
FDI promotion through domestic reforms and trade and investment negotiations is much 
more recent. Under President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) Bogotá’s economic strategy has 
focussed on promoting both local and foreign investment. Uribe’s FEP agenda remained 
aligned with the US (a demarche known in Classical times as respice polum: “look to the 
metropole [i.e. the capital of the Empire: in today’s world, metaphorically, the North]”); 
however, in his second term, the highly Presidential Colombian foreign policy took a turn 
towards attracting FDI through the negotiation of FTAs, an SP with the EU, and BITs with 
politically strategic (i.e. more than just trade) partners. Domestically, many LSCs were 
signed, and investment climate reforms were carried out to satisfy the expectations of 
transnational economic groups (Guerra-Barón 2012a:394). Uribe’s ideas not only permeated 
public policies in Colombia, but were also disseminated into the international arena too. His 
centre-right political posture reected the way Bogotá led its foreign relations (Pastrana & 
Vera 2012:64), and Colombia considered an FTA with the US a national priority. Uribe’s 
trade and investment negotiating strategy was aggressive and yet, ironically, conservative 
when compared with other CIVETS countries. During the 1990s Bogotá had full 
membership of the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Comunidad 
Andina de Naciónes (CAN), an imperfect free trade zone; an FTA with Mexico (formerly the 
so-called “G-3” that included Venezuela); and access to the US and European markets 
through preferential trade agreements. Many of Colombia’s FTAs (viz. with the US, South 
Korea, Canada, Northern Triangle, EFTA) and BITs (viz. with China, Japan, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany) were negotiated in the early 21st century, and a Multi-Party 
Agreement and Strategic Partnership (SP) was signed with the EU.
After almost ten years of President Uribe’s ‘micro-management’ (Pastrana & Vera 2012:58), 
Juan Manuel Santos came to power in 2010. Trained as an economist and business manager 
in post-graduate studies in British and American universities, Santos inherited Uribe’s trade 
respect and compromise with WTO and UNCTAD principles of trade and investment, 
leading to international treaties negotiated and celebrated with strategic partners; and, nally, 
have reached a common understanding with these partners regarding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, as recognized in numerous IIAs. 
However, historic factors also lie behind such an alignment. e debt crisis of the 1980s 
caused states which needed international loans to be issued recommendations by 
international nancial institutions (IFIs) and by the US Department of Treasury 
(Guerra-Barón 2013). All CIVETS countries implemented stabilization packages and 
structural adjustment measures which came to be known as the “Washington Consensus”. 
e nancial crisis is thus revealed as a pivotal factor that not only facilitated the desired FEP 
convergence of CIVETS, but also can explain how rapidly the transnational policy network 
of the neoliberal formula was disseminated during the 1990s, especially through soft 
mechanisms such as the signing of IIAs and letters of understanding with the IMF. Moreover, 
the necessity to re-establish a scal equilibrium drove CIVETS countries to implement trade 
openness in the international arena and economic deregulation domestically.
 
Considering convergence as ‘the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, cited by Drezner 
2001:53), the Washington Consensus recommendations adopted by CIVETS were 
convergent. Except for Vietnam – the only country to accede to the WTO in the 21st century 
(2007), – the other CIVETS have been following the multilateral trade and investment 
principles agreed in the Uruguay Round since 1995. Coherent with the multilateral scenario, 
CIVETS has carried on an intense agenda of negotiating IIAs with key political and 
economic partners. It should be noted, however, that this convergence reected no eort of 
the CIVETS policy-makers either to coordinate or harmonize their FEPs, but rather suggests 
a phenomenon facilitated by global governance in trade. It is worth asking whether there 
were government eorts that ventured beyond fortuitous convergence towards coordination 
or cooperation in investment or trade, and whether it is possible that, after the invention of 
the CIVETS acronym in 2009, the self-appointed leadership of Colombian President Santos 
(2010-current)2 promoted a framework of multilateral cooperation between the CIVETS 
economic miracles.
 
and domestic policies. In the second section, a comparative analysis will be undertaken on 
the following CIVETS sub-groups: (i) Colombia and South Africa, due to their background 
of conict and economic openness in the 1990s; (ii) Indonesia and Vietnam, due to their 
common situation in South East Asia; and (iii) Egypt and Turkey, due to their geo-strategic 
importance and their quality as “pivotal states” (Chase et al. 1996). In the third and nal 
section, the ideational dimension will be incorporated as a complementary factor explaining 
FEP convergence. 
1. INCORPORATING SYSTEMIC ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND CIVETS’ FEP 
CONVERGENCE.
Developing countries have taken advantage of their membership of certain international 
organizations such as the WTO to revise their domestic and foreign policies according to 
international investment standards (Büte & Milner 2008:745). Despite the fact that most 
CIVETS countries acceded to the WTO in 1994 (eective as of 1995) with a strategic view 
to adjusting to neoliberal ideas and so to participate in the global trade and investment 
environment, the decision to embrace the neoliberal logic was proximately responding to the 
pressure to overcome the nancial crisis of the 1980s by accepting and implementing IMF 
recommendations. Furthermore, during the 1990s and the early 21st century, most CIVETS’ 
policy-makers were either trained in the US or adopted the ideas of the Washington 
Consensus through their foreign aairs advisory bodies. In that context, it is clear that the 
phenomenon of policy convergence is easier to understand when the ideas and background 
of the main leaders are included as one of the variables of analysis.
Following the reasoning of Cohen (1990:267) about the comprehension of ‘foreign 
economic policy behaviour of governments and the issue of what it is that fundamentally 
motivates states in their international economic relations’, the individual behaviour of 
CIVETS countries will be taken as the unit of analysis, and analysed at the system level: states 
react to stimuli which come from the international system (Velosa 2012, 40). International 
structural factors will thus be taken into consideration to reach a conclusion. Additionally, an 
“inside-out” approach through the cognitive level of analysis (Cohen 1990:268) will be 
supplemented to round out the understanding of FEP convergence. Policy makers’ ideas have 
a strong inuence in determining how and when to adopt international investment principles 
already settled by WTO or UNCTAD as well as standards still in process of being consolidated in 
international customary law. Combining systemic and cognitive variables to explain FEP 
convergence amongst CIVETS is a novel and worthwhile exploratory methodology.
While structural approaches explain policy convergence by focussing on the pressure that 
economic factors may exert on political units (states), agent centred approaches emphasise 
the role that beliefs play in settling on institutions and regulations; viz. the ideational factor 
(Drezner, 2011). e anarchy of the international system does not yield any particular 
foreign economic policy except as refracted through the lens of the unit of decision and its 
ideation of the relation of economy to security. us, the cognitive level of analysis here 
proposed focusses on the ideas of the last decision unit of analysis, that is, the President or 
Prime Minister and/or the foreign policy elite (their advisors) who accompany and support 
governmental decisions on international matters, and who in fact decide whether or not 
neo-liberalism is the economic policy framework that enhances external security the most. In 
describing the assimilation of FEP ideas that was observed, however, we shall not use the term 
coordination, as the CIVETS’ foreign policy elites have done no planning to partake in 
regionalisation or in international integration schemes amongst themselves; nor have they 
taken any steps going further than the minimal – and quite uncoordinated – assimilation 
exacted by systemic pressures and ideational inuences. is prompts us to recur to the term 
convergence as a way of summing up this uncoordinated assimilation. Drezner states that 
‘policy coordination implies some agreement on the acceptable bounds of regulatory policies’ 
(2001:57). We shall therefore not prefer this term, which is in fact far more expansive than 
convergence. Policy coordination implies agreement of some sort, even if it does not mean 
that all states agree to implement identical rules. But this is precisely what none of the 
CIVETS countries has been willing to do.
Following the denition of FEP of Nel & Stephen1 (2010:72), trade and investment 
negotiation and strategies are included in the inside-out analysis. When this analytical lens is 
brought to bear on CIVETS countries in a comparative study, common characteristics 
quickly emerge. ese countries are engaged in a race to attract FDI; thus, they have 
implemented internal changes to bring about a competitive investment climate and make 
themselves attractive host states for transnational enterprises (TNEs); have adapted their tax 
and contract legislation even so far as signing Legal Stability Contracts (LSCs) with investors; 
have adopted trade and investment negotiating strategies that share a common language of 
(Bischo 2003, cited by Nathan 2005:361-372), highly Presidential (Vale & Maseko 
1998:285), and ‘pragmatic’ (Landsberg 2010b), others perceive it as ‘coherent’ (Nathan 
2005:362). Given his background as an economist with postgraduate degrees from Britain, 
Mbeki has continued Mandela’s strategy of transforming a ird World economy through 
regional integration (Hirsch 2005:233, 245), multilateralism, and South African 
internationalism (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113). is has resulted in the country’s 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 2002 and leadership of that 
bloc (Hayter et al. 2001:69-76); its benecial membership of the SADC free trade zone; and 
its trade partnership with the EFTA countries since 2006.9 e regional power enjoyed by 
Mbeki in sub-Saharan Africa has given his country a privileged place in various global 
governance forums using only soft-power mechanisms (Draper 2011:207), and a 
developmental vision according to the neoliberal formula (Alden & Schoeman 2013:113).
 
After Mbeki’s resignation, president Zuma (2009-current) developed an FEP similar to that 
of his predecessor. Economic strategies are nourished by socio-economic transformation. 
However, some consider that under Zuma Pretoria has fallen short of the South African 
FEP’s true objectives (Landsberg 2010a; Landsberg 2010b). Be that as it may, South Africa 
continues with its ambitions to play a leadership role in Africa through economic power and 
an internationally recognised political stature in regional and multilateral settings (Mantzikos 
2010:6). 
Indonesia and Vietnam. e Asian Crisis of 1997 changed South-East Asian political and 
economic dynamics, particularly in Indonesia as the Suharto regime came to an end in 1998, 
and in Vietnam during the Tran Duc Luong period (1997-2006) as social protests reected 
changes (Zakaria & Baladas 1999). Following IMF and World Bank recommendations, both 
countries strengthened trade and nancial cooperation and (without entering into 
Indonesian or Vietnamese domestic policy issues) conceived an intra-communitarian 
interaction model (Dieter 2009:87).
 
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), although she is without 
economic or political undergraduate instruction, has emphasised Jakarta’s need to coordinate 
and cooperate with intra-ASEAN policies that aim to transform its member States into FDI 
host countries through macroeconomic adjustments and scal decit management. is will 
hopefully liberate Indonesia from its excessive dependency on IMF recommendations. Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-current) succeeded Sukarnoputri in 2004. A politician with a 
military background who believed he could strike a balance between protectionism and his 
advisors’ neoliberal way of thinking, Yudhoyono nally adopted a market-oriented vision, 
and three economists trained in the US were named to strategic policy positions (Liddle & 
Mujani 2005:125). Jakarta’s FEP of course prioritised ASEAN, but without neglecting the 
Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), the East Asian Community 
(EAC) or the G20 (Kimura 2011). It has adopted a more aggressive trade approach and an 
unequivocally promotional strategy of negotiating IIAs consistent with Indonesia’s already 
open and neoliberal stance (Chandra 2005:552).
As for the Vietnamese experience, an excessive dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1970s 
and 1980s came to an abrupt end once the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989. A complex process 
of reform of trade, nance and tax policies – inspired by the Chinese experience of that time 
(Painter 2005:264) – explains much of Hanoi’s current economic performance (Toh & 
Gayathri 2004:170) as well as its attractiveness to FDI (Nguen 2007:211-217). Once doi 
moi (‘renovation’) was implemented in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities turned to economic 
liberalisation: they restricted state intervention in private enterprises and pushed structural 
reforms to modernise the economy through the promotion of export industries (Beresford 
2008:221). FDI was the key element of the doi moi (McGrath 1994), as was Hanoi’s 
diplomatic eorts toward better trade and investment relations with advanced economies like 
Japan to obtain access to foreign capital for development (Dinh 2009:108, 109, 112).  In 
spite of Vietnam’s self-identication in its 1992 constitution as a multi-component 
centralised economy, membership of ASEAN was granted in 1995. Its foreign policy priority 
has been to improve relations with the great powers. A debate emerged within the 
government and was carried on between anti-imperialist and pro-American schools of 
thought, but Tran Duc Luong reached an economic agreement with the US, an SP with 
Russia in 2001, and other agreements with Japan and India in 2003 (Vuving 2006:814-817), 
demonstrating that it had chosen the neoliberal model.
During Nguyen Minh Triet’s presidency (2006-11), a closer relationship between Hanoi and 
Washington was established. Facilitated by the Vietnamese accession to ASEAN in 1995, to 
APEC in 1998, and to the WTO in 2007 (Dosch 2006:237, 246), a macro-agreement on 
trade and investment was negotiated (USTR 2013). In that sense, Hanoi demonstrated that 
market socialism can work if it uses some of the techniques and instrumentalities of 
neoliberalism (Painter 2005:278), and if private actors put enough pressure on the 
government both to interact with the global economy and to design benecial trade and 
investment regimes (Dosch 2006:240). And this has happened despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has been led by anti-Imperialists since 1991 (Vuving 
2006:819, 822).
In terms of negotiating strategies, both Indonesia and Vietnam have exhibited a clearly 
convergent tendency in their respective FEPs to encourage regionalism and bilateralism 
through IIAs (Chandra 2005:545).10 is is reected in Indonesian and Vietnamese 
membership of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement of 1992; the trade agreements with 
common partners (viz. Australia-New Zealand in 2009 and China in 2004 and 2007); and 
FTAs with India in 2009, South Korea in 2006, and Japan. Except for Hanoi’s bold decision 
to have a closer relationship with Japan (Dinh 2009:100-129)11 and Jakarta’s strategy to 
negotiate a FTA with the EFTA, the countries’ FEP convergence was not reected in a 
comparable attraction of FDI ows.
 
Indeed, the nancial crisis of 1997 emerges as a pivotal factor in Jakarta’s and Hanoi’s 
formulation of their FEPs.12 In the Indonesian case, there was a pro-ASEAN foreign policy 
(Chandra 2005:545, 548), accompanied by a strategy that negotiated most (65%) of its IIAs 
in the 1990s. e extractive-industry and palm oil sectors have been the main recipients of 
FDI inows (WTO 2013), an outcome also found in the Colombian case. Similar to 
Indonesia, Vietnam underwent a boom in the negotiation of IIAs in the 1990s (35% out of 
its 58 BITs were under negotiation at that time), yet Hanoi has been less ambitious than 
Jakarta in its decision to have many BITs in force. In any case, Indonesia and Vietnam share 
most of their trade and investment partners, having 40 in common. 
Egypt and Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey are widely considered ‘pivotal states’ in their region 
(Chase et al. 1996:37); in Egypt’s case not only because of Cairo’s geo-strategic position but 
also because of its key role in the creation of the Arab League and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). After the Nasser presidency (1956-1970), during which all attempts to 
lead Egypt to adopt the GATT rules of trade openness were frustrated, Muhammad Anwar 
as-Sadat (1970-1981) swept out Nasserite ideas and opened the way to a more active 
Egyptian FEP (Farah 2009:37). In the context of an economic crisis, Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011) came to power bringing his idea of an Egyptian open-door policy. 
is, however, added to the country’s economic imbalances, causing hyperination, lack of 
economic growth, and low national income between 1986 and 1993, and marked the path 
to the 21st century. ereafter, Cairo returned to the assistance of IFI and carried out 
domestic measures needed to accede to the WTO (achieved in 1995) and to improve Egypt’s 
investment climate. However, those measures have failed to attract adequate inows of FDI 
(Farah 2009:43).
 
Egyptian policy-makers were aliated with the Democratic National Party. ey promoted 
pro-market measures through private-public partnerships so as to replace the old elite. e 
government has been greatly inuenced by an international business perspective, and under 
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004-2011) technocrats and businessmen have been enlisted 
as public servants, who have supported trade reforms to attract TNEs. Results remained 
negative, however, and Mubarak subsequently adopted a ‘Unique Policy’ in 2003 in order to 
accelerate a package of structural reforms and improve Cairo’s investment climate. Even so, 
the social discontent of the Egyptian population, as reected in negative gures of poverty 
and inequality despite trade openness and economic liberalization, has generated radical 
changes in the political environment, leading to what Fürtig calls ‘a regional power pretty 
much debilitated’ (Fürtig 2006:13), and to an interim debate between traditionalism and the 
new elite ideas (Farah 2009:1, 3).
Similar to the Indonesian, Vietnamese and South African cases, Egypt was inclined to sign 
IIAs during the 1990s, as 71% of all IIAs ever were signed by Egypt during this time (as at 
the time of writing Egypt had 100 IIAs in total). As of 2010 Egypt’s negotiators had signed 
20 BITs. Egypt adopted an approach that was extra-regional compared to Indonesia and 
Vietnam, because its best opportunities for trade and investment have not come from its 
membership of regional structures like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the 
Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement, or the Protocol on Trade Negotiations. A bilateral strategy was 
pursued with the EU (2004), EFTA, and Turkey (2007) to diversify its economy.
Regarding the Turkish case, the country is recognized as a key state,13 and although it was 
previously considered a ‘post-Cold War warrior’, it has become a ‘benign if not soft power’ 
(Kirişci 2009:33, 37, 52). As in the Colombian and Egyptian cases, Ankara has adopted the 
structural and stabilisation packages recommended by the IFIs during the 1980s. is meant 
the Washington Consensus of liberalism and an export-orientation that seeks markets abroad 
(Kirişci 2009:43). Additionally, with the objective of reaching European standards, Ankara 
implemented another austerity plan in 1994. At the beginning of the 21st century two 
economic crises have hit this Eurasian country, in 2000 and 2001, and adjustment plans 
suggested by the IMF were implemented on 7 December 2000, sending a positive message to 
Europe that reects the Turkish dream of belonging to the EU. Under Kemal Derviş (a 
former World Bank employee) a Transition Program to strengthen the Turkish economy was 
carried out. is was also a device to get closer to Brussels and, as in the Egyptian case, to 
encourage public-private partnerships (Nas 2008:51-67, 86, 91, 102).
 
Due to the structural economic crises experienced by Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
high ination (55%-106%) throughout the country, Ankara sought stronger ties with the 
IMF (Togan & Ersel 2005:3-35). e business community has inuenced the structure of 
Turkey’s FEP (Larrabee & Lesser 2003:1, 2, 7, 11), as a result of the decision to liberalise its 
economy in the early 1980s and to facilitate ‘the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s 
trade relations with the external world’ (Kirişci 2009:38). Moreover, Turkey’s bid for full 
membership of the EU has pressed policy makers to carry out economic reforms in specic 
policy domains (anti-dumping, competition, intellectual property rights, FDI protection and 
promotion), which resulted positively in more TNEs deciding to establish themselves on 
Turkish soil (Berzok & Turk 2009:2). However, the current nancial, economic and political 
crises have deeply aected both Turkey’s and Egypt’s investment climates, leading to a 
decrease of FDI inows.
Turkey’s situation is quite similar to Egypt’s. During the 1990s Ankara led its FEP toward 
deeper trade and investment relations, mainly on a bilateral level. Bearing in mind its 
domestic objective of full membership of the EU, a tari union was established in 1995 with 
the Single Market and, taking advantage of its membership of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO), a partial scope agreement with EFTA had been signed in 1992, while 
at the same time many FTAs were negotiated.14 But it was in the early 21st century that 
Ankara’s FEP adopted a strategy similar to Egypt’s of promoting IIAs (UNCTAD 2013), the 
better to insert itself into the global economy (Öniş 2010:12). However, under the Necdet 
Sezer (2000-2007) and Abdullah Gül (2007-current) Administrations, a more conservative 
approach has been pursued. Sezer has focussed on domestic matters, while Gül has shown 
some preference for the international scene (Öniş 2010:10).
Despite the dierent approaches of successive Presidents, Ankara has had to nd a way out of 
its dependency on the European market because of its crises; hence the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Eastern Europe have been given more priority. Industrialisation centres (viz. 
TOBB, MÜSİAD, TUSKON) became central features of Ankara’s FEP design, and special 
attention has been given to trade and investment on the Turkish international agenda (Öniş 
2010:12, 13). Under Sezer and Gül, policy-makers expanded cooperation with the private 
sector; but only since 2002 has trade and investment been considered central elements in 
Ankara’s FEP, so as to generate positive synergies between the State and the business 
community. Since then, the Turkish government has encouraged the creation of ‘interaction 
platforms’ of public-private interests to help in the formulation of the country’s FEP (Atli 
2011:110, 116, 121), or has allowed economic considerations to shape it (Kirişci 2009:39).
3. IDEAS MATTER IN FACILITATING FEP CONVERGENCE.
Following the reasoning of Hermann, Hermann & Hagan  (1987: 309), dierent entities are 
engaged in ‘the political apparatus of a government which identies, decides and implements 
foreign policy’ and have the ability to commit public resources and make decisions which 
cannot be readily reversed. But as such entities vary across countries, it is possible that the 
President may act as the ultimate decision unit, managing foreign relations personally. In this 
case other governmental entities will assume more marginal roles, and a Presidential foreign 
policy model will be carried on (Tickner, Pardo, Beltrán 2006). It is clear that the FEPs of the 
CIVETS countries follow such a pattern in terms of their Presidentialism, negotiating 
strategy, and willingness to adapt to international investment standards through the pursuit 
of IIAs. It is highly evident that systemic variables xated in the IFIs have been a key factor, 
as all CIVETS countries, but especially Egypt and Turkey, have sought closer ties with IFIs to 
gain access to their nancial support in times of crisis. At the same time, the CIVETS have 
also aligned with the world trade rules inscribed in the GATT and WTO agreements and 
later in the Uruguay Round; incorporated domestic changes in order to adapt to the interests 
of TNEs; sent a positive signal to foreign investors; and t in with the international 
investment standards set in multilateral forums like UNCTAD and WTO, through 
contribution to the complex network of investment treaties.
e inuence of the WTO and UNCTAD has informed the CIVETS’ FEP, as policy makers 
adapt their legal systems – constitution, law codes, and administrative rulings – to trade and 
investment standards already settled at the multilateral level. is explains the CIVETS’ 
strategy of negotiating IIAs, with Egypt the most active player, having negotiated 150 such 
agreements as of 2010. e Colombian case is exceptional, as all of the BITs notied to 
UNCTAD have been negotiated in the early 21st century. In any case, most CIVETS 
countries have entrusted the leading role in their negotiating strategies to their ministries of 
trade or commerce; foreign ministries have played a secondary role, except in the case of 
Turkey where ‘the military and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs [are the] traditional foreign 
policy makers’ (Kirişci 2009:48).
 
Additionally, the CIVETS countries’ common objective of internationalisation and the 
adaptation of their economies to hard and soft law standards in trade and investment has 
uniformly been determined in a context of crisis: the 1980s debt crisis in the Colombian case; 
the post-apartheid opening to the world economy in the South African case; the nancial 
crisis of 1997 in the cases of Indonesia and Vietnam; the structural nancial crises of Turkey 
since the 1980s; and in the Egyptian case the structural context of economic crisis, 
hyperination and poor economic performance since 1981.
e weight of ideas on the CIVETS’ formulation of their FEPs has been decisive, as their 
foreign policy elites have been led or advised by public servants or counsellors trained in 
academic centres that faithfully support the pro-free market ideology. It follows that agency 
in the CIVETS’ has been, directly or indirectly, shaped by neoliberalism to the point of 
recognising it through changes in domestic law. Even though Colombia has acknowledged its 
need to internationalise its economy since the beginning of the 20th century under successive 
Conservative governments, emphasis on investment as an engine of economic growth has 
been candidly recognised as the key issue of the 21st century at two levels: (i) the cultivation 
of trust for local investors despite the guerrillas, and (ii) the cultivation of stability and legal 
certainty for the transnational business community. Santos’ highly geo-economic reasoning, 
plus his colleagues’ ‘liberal way of thinking’ has proved decisive (Pastrana & Vera 2012:67), 
as Bogotá tries to integrate these two dimensions into its NDP. Couched in highly 
macro-economic terms, the NDP aims to have Colombia’s international relevance recognised 
through the cultivation of active synergies between public policy and private interest.
e construction of South Africa’s FEP under the Mandela-Mbeki duumvirate was 
revolutionary, as Mandela proceeded to nourish it with the idea of social inclusion and the 
full participation of all in the benets derived from economic growth, while Mbeki aimed to 
include socio-economic factors in foreign policy to take advantage of South Africa’s 
geo-strategic inuence.
 
In the Indonesian and Vietnamese cases, their FEPs were transformed by the nancial crisis 
in 1997, which eventuated in the publicly acknowledged necessity of deeper investment 
relations with their regional counterparts within the ASEAN framework. Hanoi has reached 
its objectives more easily after being accepted in APEC and WTO, having consolidated since 
then a complex network of international treaties on trade and investment matters.15 
Similar to the Colombian case, Egypt’s FEP has been strongly inuenced by its foreign policy 
elite, followed by technocratic inuence on an NDP structure that has candidly reected 
neoliberal ideas as well as business interests, which clearly found expression during Mubarak’s 
regime in the number of IIAs notied (UNCTAD Database 2013). Cairo’s desire to stimulate 
economic growth out of its FEP design, however, has been undermined by recent political 
turmoil.16 Turkey, on the other hand, has focused its FEP on overcoming the country’s 
structural nancial crises through the promotion of closer relations with IFIs and its possible 
accession to the EU. In that sense, Turkey’s nature as a trading state results from a variety of 
actors participating in ‘foreign policy-making or diplomatic games’, whose interests dier 
from traditional players in including economic not just security interests and issues, such as 
‘the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment 
[i.e. promote FDI outows]’ (cited by Kirişci 2009:34).
In summary, domestic reforms as well as bilateral and multilateral engagement in trade and investment 
negotiations during the 1990s meant for CIVETS an FEP strategy that adhered to the international 
economic system’s demands and answered to domestic and transnational pressures from local 
industries and TNEs. Systemic drivers of an economic nature have thus converged with policy-makers’ 
liberalising ideas of internationalising the CIVETS economies, which has undoubtedly facilitated the 
phenomenon of FEP convergence in these emerging economies. Paradoxically, the results obtained 
individually in terms of FDI net inows in the period 2000-2010 were uneven; during which 
Vietnam was CIVETS’ best performer in 2008, Egypt in 2006, and Colombia in 2005.
However, it should be emphasised that the CIVETS label has nothing to do with their FEP 
convergence; it is nothing but an acronym. It explains why throughout this working paper 
the term used to explain the CIVETS phenomena is convergence. In fact, interviews with 
certain key representatives of CIVETS countries made quite clear the absence of any interest 
in mutual coordination of their FEPs; indeed, their foreign policy elites lack of knowledge of 
the acronym itself. e CIVETS countries, far from reaching accord ‘on the acceptable 
bounds of regulatory policies’ (Drezner 2001, 57), rather constitute a good example of the 
quasi-systemic inuence of non-state actors on states, mainly emerging economies, and their 
FEP congurations.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the CIVETS never transcended the integration process, as the BRICS did, the 
acronym still refers to a group of emerging economies whose policy-makers may explore 
possibilities to further cooperate on investment issues. Yet the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs 
is better understood through systemic and historical factors, such as economic and nancial 
crises that acted as triggers to transition developing nations from the ISI model to the 
open-economy model. Historical factors shared mainly by Colombia, Egypt and Turkey (the 
1980s external debt crisis) explain their policy-makers’ common strategy to adopt IFIs’ 
recommendations and GATT/1947. By contrast, Indonesia and Vietnam were much aected 
by their nancial crises in 1997, which drove them to the convergent priority of participating 
actively in ASEAN and improving trade relations with their (not necessarily Asian) 
counterparts through the cultivation of trust relationships.
 
Hanoi’s doi moi led all eorts to become an ASEAN member-state; improve its investment 
climate; and facilitate foreign investment, while downplaying its quality as a planned 
economy. Jakarta, by contrast, decided to have deeper trade relations with non-ASEAN 
countries through IIA negotiations (Chandra 2005:542, 552). Regarding South Africa’s FEP, 
its content is intimately connected with the principle of enabling all its population to benet 
from economic growth in the teeth of the social and racial issues of a post-apartheid regime. 
Despite these particularist dierences, a shared need to internationalise economically and to 
participate actively in the international economic system, especially during the 1990s, 
became the cornerstone that has facilitated the phenomenon of convergence, even without 
cooperation or coordination between the governments in question.
negotiating agenda (Guerra Barón 2012a:395), and focused his interest on reinventing 
Colombia’s image worldwide and playing a role in the international system. He made 
Colombia’s emerging market economy attractive to foreign investment through a national 
development plan (NDP) that has ‘International Relevance’ as one of the central pillars of its 
mandate (Guerra Barón 2012b:386). Santos has expanded Colombia’s foreign policy of state 
actions and strategies, as reected in the sophisticated lobbying done by Colombia’s embassy 
to the United States to win the approval of the Colombia-US FTA in Congress, and to push 
forward the provisional entry into force of the trade agreement with the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) and the Multi-Parties SP agreement with the European Union. Such an 
expansive mentality reects the political inuence of the Pacic Alliance (founded in 2011) 
toward the diversication of the trade agenda with Asian and African countries, including 
some of the other CIVETS (viz. Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey), as well as China, Israel, Panama, 
Singapore, and Japan (Guerra Barón 2012a:395).
e South African case is similar to Colombia in chronological terms. After South Africa’s 
diplomatic isolation from the international community during the period of apartheid,7 
Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) led the African nation into integration into the world 
economy (Geldenhuys 1984, cited by Flemes 2007:18). He did this by adopting neoliberal 
ideas and attracting FDI as a mechanism of economic growth (Alden & Vieira 2007:146). 
Mandela’s economic growth and liberalisation strategy (1994-1996) was adjusted to achieve 
social equality and democratise access to the benets of economic growth (Hirsch 2005:210). 
In that context, the South African re-birth (Vale & Maseko 1998:274) was clearly reected 
in its FEP, as Mandela promoted multilateralism and new economic blocs such as the 
Southern African Development Community8 (SADC) in 1992 (Alden & Vieira 2007:141). 
e ‘new South Africa’ (Guy 2000:59) inherited by Mbeki (1999-2009) promoted wider and 
more equitable access to the benets derived from the country’s economic growth. At that 
time Pretoria was pushing to be recognised as the ‘natural leader’ of the continent, while 
deepening trade relations using a ‘buttery strategy’ that straddles both Brazil and India 
(Alden & Vieira 2007:147-148).
Although some authors have characterised South Africa’s foreign policy as being ‘ambiguous’ 
Ankara’s objective of full membership of the EU aected both domestic and foreign policy. 
Convinced of the importance of following the IFIs’ recommendations in order to qualify for 
nancial assistance and to improve Turkey’s relationship with those organisations, the 1990s 
and the 21st century have seen the participation of business elites in the shaping of Ankara’s 
FEP. Political instability, however, has been the nemesis of both Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
economic projects.
 
As ‘brute’ systemic factors do not fully explain the convergence of CIVETS’ FEPs, returning 
to the argument of Drezner (2001:57), it is possible to conclude that policy-makers’ ideas 
(the last unit of decision of the elite) have inuenced their countries’ FEPs by principles 
already settled in international organizations. With such an argument it is possible to explain 
the CIVETS’ FEP convergence as related to negotiating strategies, as well as to domestic 
changes which have outtted national legislation with TNE demands. In the Colombian 
case, Uribe’s strategy adjusted the country to international rankings – e.g., Doing Business 
(World Bank) and the World Investment Report (UNCTAD), – while Santos’ NDP was to 
continue the negotiating agenda with selected trade partners and improve Colombia’s prole 
at both regional and global levels. Similar to the Colombian experience, Mandela’s legacy has 
been to focus South Africa’s FEP on integrating the economy into the world trade system, 
while Mbeki has rened this new approach to trade and investment.
 
Regarding Indonesia and Vietnam, the elites’ ideas played an important role in FEP 
formulation. e neoliberal way of thinking has oodlit Jakarta’s FEP: it adopted an 
aggressive strategy to overcome more than thirty years of Suharto’s rule. Meanwhile, Hanoi 
has constructed its FEP via a bargaining game between its bureaucratic elites and its private 
and public stakeholders. As Dosch states, the traditional Vietnamese elites, in the person of 
its Foreign Aairs Ministry, led the making of FEP, yet public actors (the trade, investment 
and planning bureaux) and private actors (entrepreneurs and policy think tanks) have also 
enriched it (2006:239-240).
In Egypt and Turkey the neoliberal vision adopted by the state’s policy-making elites irrigated 
a pragmatic foreign policy coherent with the business community’s interests. However, since 
Mubarak left power, political instability has upset Egypt’s economic performance.
 
Finally, it should be emphasised once again that the coining of the CIVETS label had 
nothing to do with their FEP convergence. In fact, interviews with some key representatives 
of CIVETS countries have made clear the absence of any mutual interest in coordinating 
their FEPs. It follows that these emerging economies are a good example of the incidence of 
the IFI’s economic formulas, spread throughout the CIVETS territories (and likely beyond), 
especially in the aftermath of critical conjunctures such as the debt crises of the 1980s, in the 
cases of Colombia, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa, and the Asian Crisis of 1997, in the cases 
of Indonesia and Vietnam; as well as the inuence of ideational elements of (as yet) unknown 
provenance on these countries’ political leaders and foreign policy making elites.
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